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Abstract 
The need to effectively and efficiently provide emergency supplies and 
services is increasing all over the world.  We investigate four policy options—
prepositioning supplemental resources, preemptive as well as phased deployment of 
assets, and a surge of supplies and services—as potential strategies for responding 
to a disaster.  We illustrate the linkage between our four policy options and a 
disaster classification based upon disaster localization (dispersed or local) and 
speed of disaster onset (slow or sudden).  We summarize our work by introducing a 
matrix that aligns logistics strategies with disaster types in order to assist policy-
makers in their resource management decisions.  
Keywords: logistics, natural disaster, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian 
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I. Introduction 
In 2009 there were 335 natural disasters reported worldwide that killed 10,655 
persons, affected more than 119 million others, and caused over $41.3 billion in 
economic damages (Vos, Rodriguez, Below, & Guha-Sapir. 2009).  The number of 
natural disasters reported between 1900 and 2010 has increased significantly and, 
with it, the number of requests for aid and humanitarian assistance (see Figure 1).  
While the trend in the number of disasters reported shows an increase, it is not clear 
that there has been a commensurate response in terms of preparedness.  The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that of all funds 
used to support disaster operations, 90% are spent for response, whereas 10% are 
spent on preparedness activities and investments and risk reduction (A. Giegerich, 
personal communication, September 21, 2010).  The United Nations estimates that 
every dollar spent to prepare for a disaster saves seven dollars in disaster response 
(United Nations Human Development Program, 2007).   
 
Figure 1. Number of Disasters Reported from 1900–2010 
(EM–DAT, 2011) 
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Although the objective of all the organizations and agencies involved in 
humanitarian assistance is to reduce human suffering and casualties, the duration 
and severity of the human toll during a natural disaster is largely dependent upon the 
speed and scope of the response, which is often a function of the level of 
preparedness that has been established prior to the disaster event.  While there are 
no internationally agreed upon metrics by which to judge or measure the 
effectiveness of a response to a disaster, scholars working in the humanitarian and 
disaster response research area have found that improvement is desirable (Apte, 
2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  An effective and efficient humanitarian response 
depends “on the ability of logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at 
the site of a humanitarian relief effort” (Thomas, 2003).  In this research we focus on 
the response to a disaster area in the form of distributing supplies, and strategies 
that will enhance the effectiveness of such a response.  For the purpose of this 
research, we accept the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ 
(CRED) definition of disaster, which is “a situation or event which overwhelms local 
capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external 
assistance.” 
 The unpredictability of the timing of a disaster, as well as the scope of its 
human and material destruction, raises several serious questions for emergency 
planners and first responders.  For example, how can a state of supply 
preparedness be established and maintained?  How should adequate prepositioned 
disaster relief inventory be established and sustained over time, to include the 
rotation of perishable stocks?  How can information regarding the location, quantity, 
and condition of prepositioned inventory be shared, and what effect would this 
information sharing have on the total investment of prepositioned stocks?  Is 
prepositioning the best strategy for all types of disasters?  How reliable are the 
potential supply lines if it is determined that supplies should be virtually stockpiled 
(that is, a detailed list or database of supplies by type and quantity is created and 
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Should the supplies be sourced locally or from outside the disaster zone?  Answers 
to these questions depend on the expected onset speed of the disaster, the volume 
and weight of supplies to be moved, the expected magnitude of humanitarian relief 
required, and the expected likelihood of a disaster in the area.  
As part of our investigation we explore four policy options: (1) prepositioning 
supplemental resources in or near the incident location; (2) proactive deployment of 
assets in advance of a request; (3) phased deployment of assets and supplies, 
analogous to the “just in time” inventory control philosophy practiced by many 
commercial manufacturers; and (4) “surge” transportation of manpower and 
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II. Literature Review 
One of the major issues in a response supply chain in case of a natural 
disaster is to coordinate the operations and relief inventories over a large number of 
stages, locations, and organizations.  This has to be done while providing the 
emergency supplies and services to the affected population under extreme 
conditions.  Decisions regarding the types of provisions that should be 
prepositioned, as well as their location, should be made well before a disaster strikes 
in order to provide quick response.  To some extent, without such a high level of 
uncertainty and an adverse environment, it is similar to the core question in supply 
chain management of coordinating activities and inventories over a spectrum of 
stages of the supply chain and facility locations of the inventory (Schoenmeyr & 
Graves, 2009).  
In the private sector, it has been found that if each individual stage in a serial-
system of the supply chain operates with a designated base stock policy with service 
guarantees, then the optimal safety stock strategy is to maintain inventory at certain 
key locations, which results in separating the stages of the supply chain; this type of 
policy allows each stage to operate independently by minimizing the need for 
communication and coordination amongst players (Simpson, 1958; Graves & 
Willems, 2002).  Models available in supply chain management literature are 
predominantly with unlimited capacity for storage.  In cases where there is unlimited 
capacity, the amount of safety stock needed is less than the level needed with 
capacity constraint (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009).  
The determination of the optimal placement of safety stock in a supply chain 
has been addressed by Simpson (1958) and Schoenmeyr and Graves (2008), where 
there are evolving or predetermined forecasts, and by Graves and Willems (2002), 
where there is uncertain, as well as non-stationary, demand. This concept can 
explain the response supply chain where there exists uncertainty for the quantity 
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Swann, & Villareal, 2009).  Rawls and Turnquist (2010) developed a model for 
determining the location and quantity of supplies that should be prepositioned when 
there is uncertainty with respect to whether a disaster will occur and where it will 
occur, and built upon this work by adding service quality constraints (Rawls & 
Turnquist, 2011) to ensure the probability of meeting demand and the average 
shipment distance is within a specified parameter.  In addition to the prepositioning 
of relief inventories, a disaster response may require the formulation of policies that 
require the expansion of warehouses, medical facilities, and temporary shelters, 
while infrastructure preparation may include the provision of airstrips and ramp 
space at existing airfields (Salmeron & Apte, 2010).  Koavacs and Spens (2009) 
weighed the difference between traditional commercial logistics and humanitarian 
logistics.  With humanitarian logistics, it is imperative to go beyond the profitability of 
commercial logistics.  Within the domain of humanitarian logistics, suppliers have 
different motivations for participating, and customers do not generate voluntary 
demand. It is clear that in most cases a “repeat purchase” is not a possibility.  Thus, 
supply networks must take into account the lack of true demand.  Demand is 
dictated by the relief agencies that are the primary actors within this framework.  
Therefore, it is the responsibility of the agency to “push” the supplies to the disaster 
location in the immediate response phase, which is different from the commercial 
philosophy of pull-based demand.  Humanitarian logistics focuses on getting the 
greatest volume of supplies to the points where they are needed, and there may be 
lessons learned in the commercial sector that could be used to improve the planning 
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III. Disaster Life Cycles 
The life cycle of a disaster from the perspective of Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (HADR) is divided into three stages (as illustrated in Figure 2): 
being prepared in the pre-disaster stage, response as the disaster strikes, and 
recovery in post-disaster (Apte 2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
 
Figure 2. Life Cycle of Disasters  
(Apte, 2009) 
Disaster preparedness is the first step in mitigating the adverse impacts of 
any unforeseen catastrophic event.  Preparedness on an individual level is defined 
by the creation of an escape and survival plan, as well as the procurement and 
storage of supplies that will enable an individual to act on the plan.  Preparedness at 
an organizational or institutional level translates to the planning and pre-
establishment of adequate capacity and resources that will enable efficient relief 
operations.  Prepositioning of war reserve and contingency stocks, such as that 
practiced by each of the U.S. Armed Services, has proven an effective means of 
increasing the speed of response to a conflict (Abell et al., 2000; Button, Gordon, 
Hoffmann, Riposo, & Wilson, 2010; Hura & Robinson, 1991).  The private 
commercial sector, too, has been involved in prepositioning strategic safety stocks in 
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constraints (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009), and non-stationary demands (Graves & 
Willems, 2002, 2008).     
Disaster response is a function of the preparation that took place prior to the 
disaster event, as well as the coordination of available supplies and distribution 
capacity.  The first part of the response consists of gaining situational awareness of 
events and conditions on the ground in the disaster area through the collection of 
available information, and then using this information and awareness to generate an 
operational picture that will inform the nature, scale, and timing of the response.  The 
result of this collection of information and establishment of situational awareness is a 
needs assessment or requirement for assistance.  The response itself is largely 
comprised of the tactical activities that must take place to move needed supplies to 
those parts of the disaster area that have the most critical demand, given the 
available resources at hand.  
Disaster recovery consists of stabilizing the disaster area and improving the 
living and economic conditions of those affected by the catastrophic event.  The 
recovery phase means different things to different organizations.  For the military, 
the recovery phase likely signals the beginning of drawn-down or redeployment 
operations, whereby military personnel and equipment are withdrawn and 
responsibility turned over to civil authorities.  For non-governmental and non-military 
aid organizations, the recovery phase may consist of establishing semi-permanent 
camps, aid stations, or warehouses to shelter displaced persons; delivering critical 
services that cannot be provided by other civil authorities; and coordinating the 
storage and distribution of supplies that are otherwise unavailable or in short supply 
to the local population.  
Studying the life cycle of recent disasters offers insight into both short-term 
and long-term consequences.  It also provides us with numerous lessons to form 
effective strategies for mitigating future disasters.  However, in order to formulate 
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IV. Disaster Classification 
Disasters are often classified based on the speed of onset and the source or 
cause of the disaster (Ergun, Heier, & Swann, 2008; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
However, in our research we focus on four disaster scenarios that are combinations 
of the geographic dispersion of the disaster (dispersed or localized) and its speed of 
onset (slow or sudden), as discussed by Apte (2009) and described in Figure 3.  We 
differentiate local from dispersed disasters in terms of the number of civil 
administrative districts impacted, such as cities, counties, townships, parishes, 
prefectures, provinces, or states.  As the number of civil administrative districts 
increases, so does the geographic area impacted, resulting in an increase in the 
complexity associated with responding to the disaster.  It is the coordination of effort 
across multiple districts, coupled with the size of the relief requirement, which 
frustrates the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and disaster response 
operations.  Slow-onset disasters are defined as those that allow potentially affected 
populations time to react in order to mitigate the impact of the disaster, whereas 
sudden-onset disasters allow little to no time to react to the disaster event.  The 
disaster classification suggests that the level of difficulty in the logistics execution is 
less onerous in the case of localized, slow-onset disasters (depicted in quadrant III 
of Figure 3) because there may be adequate lead-time and local resources to 
prepare for the response.   
We next discuss four specific disaster cases that exhibit different onset and 
localization characteristics, as illustrated in Figure 3, and serve as exemplars of 
strategies that are appropriate to specific disaster types, as described in the 
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Figure 3. Classification of Disasters  
(Apte, 2009) 
A. Indian Ocean “Boxing Day” Tsunami of 2004 
Dispersed and sudden-onset disasters (depicted in quadrant I of Figure 3) 
tend to be the most catastrophic in humanitarian terms because they lack warning in 
advance of their onset, and they impact large geographic areas that often cross 
multiple civil administrative areas, making coordination critical and difficult.  The 
Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 was the result of a 9.1 magnitude earthquake and 
was responsible for more than 227,000 deaths, more than 500,000 injured, over 2 
million missing, and more than 1.5 million displaced persons across more than 12 
countries (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011).  The destruction was primarily limited to the 
coastal regions (Samek, Skole, & Chomentowski, 2004), but was dispersed across 
so many countries that relief efforts were frustrated by the lack of complete reports 
of the damage to those countries affected and of the specific types of aid and 
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Most of the people affected by the tsunami did not actually know it was 
coming.  Because the earthquake occurred far offshore, those affected on land were 
not aware of it and had no way of knowing the tsunami was coming.  The 
earthquake occurred so far away that it was not felt. The key problem was 
notification.  Agencies that did sense the earthquake were not able to effectively 
notify those areas that might be potentially affected and even if they did the agencies 
did not have adequate means of disseminating the potential threat of a tsunami to all 
those that might be affected. It should be noted at this juncture that there was no 
tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean.  Some areas, particularly the Banda 
Aceh region of Sumatra in Indonesia, lacked a basic, functioning transportation 
infrastructure, which imposed severe capacity constraints on the flow of inbound 
supplies.  
B. Haiti 2010 Earthquake 
A sudden-onset disaster, even if localized (depicted in quadrant II of Figure 
3), creates operational difficulties that are greater than circumstances where the 
onset is slow, but less than if the catastrophe were both rapid in its onset and 
geographically dispersed.  Sudden-onset disasters deny authorities and the public 
time to prepare for the consequences of the disaster event and, therefore, tend to 
exact a much higher human cost.  The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 
2010, measured 7.0 in magnitude on the Richter scale, resulting in more than 
200,000 dead (United Nations, 2010).  Poorly designed and constructed buildings, 
bridges, and other infrastructure resulted in significant losses, the creation of large 
debris fields and obstructions to transportation, and a need for large-scale rescue 
efforts of those trapped alive underneath concrete and steel wreckage.  
The government of Haiti was immobilized with a significant percentage of the 
national leadership dead or missing as a result of the earthquake.  With little ability 
to assess damage or mobilize and manage the few resources that were not 
destroyed in the quake, the surviving population were left to rely on the response of 
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food, water, medicine, and shelter.  Lack of physical infrastructure, especially in 
underdeveloped and poor countries, causes long lead-times in transportation, which 
was evident in Haiti.  The consequences of poor governance and weak institutions 
were evident in the Haiti disaster, and so, in spite of the proactive deployment from 
the rest of the world, suffering persists.  
C. Hurricane Katrina  
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the city of New Orleans.  It was 
known days in advance that the hurricane might make landfall in New Orleans, and 
although the city had warned residents, there were many who remained and were 
killed, stranded, or left homeless as a direct result of the storm’s violence or the 
failure of the levee system that otherwise protected the city from flooding.  Hurricane 
Katrina was a slow-onset, localized disaster (see quadrant III of Figure 3) and one of 
the most devastating and costly hurricanes to strike the United States.  Once the 
storm had passed, more than 80% of the city of New Orleans was under water, 
approximately 1,700 people were dead, 1 million persons were displaced, and an 
estimated $135 billion in damage along the Gulf coast was incurred (Plyer, 2010).  
The official plan for the city was for displaced residents to gather in the New Orleans 
Superdome football arena in the downtown center as a refuge of last resort.  
However, due to failed infrastructure and lack of planning for needed supplies to be 
delivered to the affected area, those who sought refuge during the critical first week 
following the landfall of the storm found thousands of people confined in a large 
open building whose roof was torn open and which had no functioning utilities, such 
as electricity or water.  The state of Louisiana activated the National Guard and after 
several days, buses were organized to begin evacuating those still in the city to 
outlying areas.  
D. Influenza “Swine Flu” Epidemic of 2009 
Quadrant IV describes a context where the onset is slow but the affected area 
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geographical area, it may take substantial planning, resource allocation, and 
coordination among the military, humanitarian organizations, and local, federal, and 
perhaps even foreign, government representatives.  The 2009 influenza epidemic is 
an example of a slow-onset, geographically dispersed disaster event affecting 
multiple countries (see Figure 4).  The epidemic was responsible for more than 
14,000 known deaths (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
[ECDC], 2010), which occurred throughout the world. Subsequent research has 
shown that the seriousness of the influenza cases was not necessarily greater than 
other influenza outbreaks (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 
2010), but the population affected was different, with children affected in much 
higher numbers than other influenza outbreaks on record at the time (Belongia et al., 
2010).  Although the numbers of people who have died from the H1N1 influenza 
have been modest since the pandemic in 2009, there remains a significant threat 
that the disease could mutate into an antibiotic resistant strain that could eventually 
kill millions of people worldwide; the CDC has stated that H1N1 and H3N3 influenza 
strains are both highly resistant to two of the four licensed influenza antiviral agents 
(CDC, 2011).  
The public health response to the 2009 pandemic faced challenges in the 
form of educating the public about the severity of the epidemic, managing initial 
shortages of vaccine inventories in the initial weeks of the declared pandemic 
(Responding to the 2009–2010 Influenza Season, 2009), as well as determining 
distribution points for the vaccines.  Effective vaccine distribution is dependent upon 
the ability of public health officials to detect virulent strains that might result in a 
pandemic.  Once a strain is identified that might result in a pandemic or once a 
pandemic has been declared, public health officials must decide when to begin the 
mass production of a vaccine.  Because influenza mutates rapidly, it is not feasible 
to stockpile vaccines for long periods in anticipation of a particular, currently 
identified strain.  Instead, surge capacity must be established to respond to a 
potential pandemic, and then distribution networks must be capable of moving the 

















Figure 4. 2009 Confirmed Cases of H1N1 Flu by Country  
(ECDC, 2010) 
One of the key problems with vaccines for influenza is that they cannot be 
prepositioned far in advance because the influenza strains mutate, making it 
necessary for epidemiologists to forecast what they believe will be the dominant 
strain of influence in advance.  So, essentially the responders must rely upon 
availability of the vaccines. If there is none available it has to be produced and then 
distribute the produced vaccine as quickly as possible and ensure that the most 
vulnerable and/or necessary people get it first.  The Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS), which is jointly run by the CDC and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), contains an inventory of antibiotics, antidotes, and vaccines for rapid 
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V. Discussion 
The disasters we have discussed in the previous section illustrate the 
strategic, as well as operational, difficulties faced when responding to a disaster.  
Though the disasters are classified into four quadrants, we believe the terms slow, 
sudden onset, localized, and dispersed are relative.  A hurricane is slow in onset 
because there is some forecast available and, hence, it is imminent but not 
necessarily sudden.  A pandemic, on the other hand, is very slow compared to the 
time between when a hurricane is identified and when it makes landfall.  At the other 
end of the spectrum is an earthquake, which is instantaneous, with aftershocks in 
the category of slow, since they are imminent.  
The geographic dispersion of a disaster is also relative since a disaster can 
be considered to be localized if only one governing entity or administrative district 
(such as a city, town, or county) is involved or several communities are affected.  
Such granular classification could be a topic for further research; however, in our 
work we confine our analysis to the general categories of sudden and slow when 
discussing onset, and to localized and dispersed when considering geographic 
dispersion.  
We next consider four fundamental strategies an organization could employ 
to respond to natural disasters in the context of the exemplars presented in the 
previous section: prepositioning, proactive deployment of assets in advance of a 
request, phased deployment of assets and supplies, and “surge” capacity planning 
of manpower and equipment from locations outside the disaster area to the area of 
most need.   
A. Prepositioning 
The success of the military in using prepositioned stocks has developed 
interest in the prospect of using such a strategy to support operations other than war 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 16 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
supplemental resources in or near the incident location most resembles the military 
practice of storing defense inventory ashore or at sea to be used in the event of a 
conflict; the Army prepositioned stocks (APS) in southwest Asia (APS–5), Korea 
(APS–4), and the Indian Ocean (APS–3) are good examples (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Army Prepositioned Stock Locations  
(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999) 
Non-governmental organizations also preposition items in advance of a 
disaster to reduce the response time of providing relief (Duran, Gutierrez, & 
Keskinocak, 2011).  Prepositioning supplies is appropriate when the lead-time to 
respond with supplies exceeds the time frame in which the supplies are needed, or 
when it is important to preserve transportation assets, such as airlift, for other 
purposes, such as personnel or higher priority movement.  When determining where 
to preposition supplies, organizations must consider the trade-offs between placing 
stocks close to a potential disaster area so that the distribution time is reduced, and 
the risk associated with being adversely impacted by the disaster if they are too 
close to the potential danger zone.  Campbell and Jones (2011) described a method 
for determining where to preposition supplies in anticipation of disaster, considering 
several different scenarios.  The authors sought to incorporate the risk associated 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 17 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
inventory that is required to respond effectively to a disaster.  Prepositioning would 
be a desirable logistics strategy for disaster events such as the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and Hurricane Katrina because it would shorten 
the lead-time to provide supplies.  However, locating the supplies outside the 
potential disaster impact zones would be necessary, and the investment in such 
inventories could be large.  The feasibility of maintaining large stocks of food, water, 
and other emergency supplies for a long period of time in countries that are poor and 
have high levels of corruption should also be considered; if the stores of 
prepositioned stocks cannot be secured, then prepositioning is ineffective.   
Prepositioning vaccines, antibiotics, and antidotes is desirable when the 
biological or chemical agent to be combated is stable and not mutating. The key 
questions of interest are where, exactly, to position the stocks, and who shall receive 
treatments.  When it is impracticable to preposition supplies well in advance of a 
disaster, it may be desirable for excess production capacity to be obtained through 
capital planning, contracting, or collaboration so that capacity itself is “prepositioned” 
to respond in the time of need.  In cases of an influenza epidemic, for example, it is 
not known well in advance which strain might be dominant and, therefore, excess 
production capacity has been established at the national level to produce the right 
vaccine when needed.  In cases where it may be economically infeasible to 
preposition supplies, it may still be possible to arrange for excess production or 
distribution capacity to be established in order to support a rapid, or “surge,” 
response, which we discuss later in this section.  
B. Proactive Deployment 
An alternative to prepositioning is the early deployment of assets in advance 
of a local government request.  For example, as federal government officials see a 
hurricane approaching the Gulf of Mexico, they could mobilize food, water, and 
temporary shelters and stage them close to, but not in, the expected disaster zone 
so that when these supplies are needed, the lead-time necessary to deliver them is 








Figure 6. An Example of Proactive Deployment of Supplies in  
Advance of a Hurricane 
It was known that Hurricane Katrina might make landfall in New Orleans days 
in advance of the disaster, and this offered time for the proactive deployment of 
supplies.  Unfortunately, public authorities tended to be reactive rather than 
proactive and did not effectively preposition medical supplies prior to the hurricane’s 
landfall (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). 
Another problem is related to displaced persons.  Companies may take care 
of the shortage of private goods but cannot adequately manage or deal with the 
shortage of public goods such as shelters for the displaced population.  
C. Phased Deployment 
Phased deployment of assets refers to timing the delivery of inventory to a 
disaster area as it is needed and in the quantity in which it is needed.  This disaster 
response is analogous to “just in time” inventory control practiced by commercial 
manufacturers and has the advantage of not committing excess inventory to a 
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Phased deployment also prevents the disaster zone from being inundated or 
saturated with inbound materiel that might otherwise reduce the overall effectiveness 
of the disaster response due to inadequate infrastructure or limitations in personnel,  
handling equipment, storage space, or some combination of all three.  Following the 
earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the lack of runway capacity, as well as equipment, 
slowed the movement of supplies and specialized personnel such as physicians, 
nurses, and search and rescue teams.  Additionally, there were capacity limitations 
at the ports, in terms of the number of containers that could be processed and the 
amount of available dry warehouse space (see Figure 7).  It was undesirable to push 
supplies into the area because the ports were not capable of handling the flow of 
materiel.  
 
Figure 7. Limited Port and Warehouse Capacity May Necessitate  
Phased Deployment 
After the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, there were enough supplies donated 
by the world’s richest countries, but there was only one airstrip and one forklift in 
Banda Aceh, the regional capital of Aceh, Indonesia.  When disaster strikes an area 
Max cargo per vessel: 
200 TEUs
7,000 MTs bulk/break bulk
Warehouse capacity: 
13,000 MTs
Max cargo per vessel: 
400 TEUs
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with limited port capacity, the phased deployment of supplies is not only prudent, but 
necessary, in order to prevent the cessation of the flow of supplies.  
D. Surge Capacity 
A surge in transportation of manpower and equipment from locations outside 
the disaster area is a final alternative that, rather than relying on prepositioned 
physical inventory, plans for excess capacity to deliver personnel and materiel in 
case of an emergency; in this instance, the “prepositioning” is with respect to 
capacity rather than inventory.  Figure 8 illustrates an example where there is surge 
capacity reserved at specific locations, labeled “Supply Warehouse,” outside of an 
anticipated disaster zone.  In this instance the disaster is a hurricane that has or will 
very soon make landfall.  Surge capacity to distribute resources from these 
warehouses that lie outside the anticipated disaster impact area may be utilized to 
respond quickly while avoiding the risk of staging goods inside the potentially 
affected area.   
 
Figure 8. Surge of Supplies From Regional Warehouses in  
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VI. Conclusion 
Localized, slow-onset natural disasters are at one end of the spectrum with 
respect to the level of difficulty for humanitarian logistics whereas dispersed, 
sudden-onset disasters are at the other.  We base our policy models on the 
classification of disasters.  
Disasters that are classified as slow onset provide time for humanitarian 
logisticians to plan and prepare for relief operations.  A disaster that strikes suddenly 
can pose difficulties for response since no organization—military or humanitarian—
can fully prepare for every need that emerges during such an event.  However, 
prepositioning strategies, such as asset placement, resource allocation, 
management of disaster relief inventory, and location of such warehouses may help.  
It is clear that whether the disaster is localized or dispersed over a large 
geographical area dictates the level of difficulty involved in disaster response. 
To assist policy-makers in their understanding and decision-making, Figure 9 
illustrates which logistics strategies are very desirable, desirable, or undesirable, 
when considering the four disaster classifications.  The fully darkened circles 
indicate that a strategy is very desirable for a particular disaster type.  A partially 
darkened circle indicates that a strategy is desirable for a particular disaster type, 
and an unfilled or hollow circle indicates that the strategy is undesirable for a 
particular disaster type.  Studying the exemplars of the disasters leads us to one 
conclusion: in all the disasters, slow or sudden onset and localized or dispersed, 
there is likely to be some type of prepositioning of supplies, but that does not mean 
this is the most desirable policy because prepositioning is always costly.  
Prepositioning may also be difficult for policy-makers to justify since investments in 
prepositioned stocks cannot show an immediate return.  Additionally, it is difficult to 
estimate which supplies to stockpile, as well as how much will be needed or can be 
reasonably afforded.  Therefore, we propose that prepositioning is a very desirable 
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transportation response lead-times exceed the time in which the supplies are most 
needed following a disaster (see Figure 9).  Prepositioning is desirable in those 
cases where the disaster may be localized and slow (such as in a hurricane zone) or 
when the disaster is dispersed and slow, such as a pandemic.  Critical supplies that 
are prepositioned in likely disaster zones or in those areas where they will most 
likely be needed (such as high-density population centers) will require fewer 
transportation assets to move those supplies when the disaster strikes, and the lead-
time is reduced between the time needed and the time they are available.  However, 
in cases of a dispersed, slow-onset disaster, it might be cost prohibitive to 
preposition large quantities of supplies over broad geographic areas.  Therefore, we 
propose that prepositioning is a somewhat desirable policy for Classification IV 
(dispersed and slow).  In case of Classification IV, localized but sudden, it may not 
be that cost prohibitive to preposition since the disaster is anticipated to be 
contained, and the faster speed of onset deems it critical to reach the affected region 
due to time sensitivity.  Thus, when the transportation lead-time or time necessary to 
increase the capacity is in excess of the anticipated need, prepositioning may be the 
suitable strategy.  Prepositioning will also help since transportation means can be 
spared for use after the disaster, due to critical and time-sensitive issues in the 
affected area and the community.  
We propose that proactive deployment is the most desirable policy that 
should be implemented for slow-onset disasters (Classifications II and III).  Slow-
onset disasters allow for planning and response and, therefore, allow for authorities 
and agencies to deploy resources in anticipation of a disaster, rather than waiting for 
the request from the potential impact area.  Advanced knowledge of the location of a 
disaster allows the use of proactive deployment, whether the disaster area is 
localized or dispersed.  Proactive deployment is particularly desirable when it is 
anticipated that the affected region will be unable to mitigate the effects of a disaster.  
The director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recently stated 
that the federal government should be more proactive in its approach to an imminent 
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case of sudden-onset disasters (Classifications I and IV), proactive deployment is 
likely to be less effective, simply because there is not ample lead-time to place 
resources in advance of the disaster event.  However, in those instances where 
there are disasters that are seasonal or imminent, proactive deployment may be 
both an efficient and effective means of mitigating adverse impacts.  
Both of the policies discussed, prepositioning and proactive deployment, 
assume that there are resources or capacity to store supplies, and that personnel 
are available to distribute the supplies during the time of need.  However, if there are 
capacity constraints for receiving the necessary supplies, phased deployment may 
be a better strategy for getting supplies to the disaster area.  When the needs in the 
disaster area are unknown or emerging, a phased deployment strategy may be 
desirable because supplies that are not needed or are in sufficient quantities will not 
be sent to the area; as time passes, the needs in the disaster area become more 
clear, and better information can be used to select the right supplies in the 
appropriate quantity.  
Surge is the last resort policy when prepositioning or proactive deployment is 
not feasible or affordable.  If one takes into account just the cost, this is not the 
policy choice for slow-onset disasters.  However, this is the most likely policy for 
sudden-onset disasters, whether localized or dispersed.  This is especially true if 
there is inadequate capacity for response and the last resort is surging the capacity 
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Figure 9. Proposed Policies 
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